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Abstract. IP traceback is the generic term given to systems that allow
the tracing of IP packets back to their originating machine. A common
shortcoming shared by existing traceback proposals is that they are able
to identify the source network, but not the source host. Our work extends
the traceback process by allowing the tracing of frames within the origi-
nating network (once this has been identified) to identify the originating
host. We extend the SPIE system (which operates at the IP routers) with
auditing at the Ethernet switches. The Ethernet traffic visibility issue is
resolved with the use of switch port mirroring. The MAC address table is
used to establish causality between the source frame address and source
switch port. Our work removes the requirement for a specific network
topology, as is the case in other known solutions. We provide a proto-
type implementation and preliminary evaluation of this to establish the
efficacy of our proposal.
1 Introduction
The connectionless and stateless nature of the Internet Protocol as a datagram
delivery service allows for the crafting of messages carrying forged (source) ad-
dress data. These ‘spoofed’ packets can facilitate various malevolent network
activities, the most notable being Denial of Service (DoS) attacks. Furthermore,
there are situations in which the source address of an IP packet is legitimately
obscured, such as in Network Address Translation. Thus, one cannot rely on the
source address reported in the header of a received packet to reveal the identity
of the originating host machine.
IP traceback is the generic term given to systems that facilitate the tracing of
packets back to their source, and various proposals exist in this area. A common
shortcoming however is in the granularity of the trace result. IP traceback can
reveal the originating network, but not the originating host (i.e., the traceback
result will at best identify the originating machine’s first hop router). When fac-
ing a DoS this might still be considered a valuable result, as filtering traffic from
the originating network would halt the attack. However, an IP traceback system
must be able to institute accountability for any given IP packet by identifying
the actual originating machine and thus serve as an effective deterrent against
network attacks.
There are numerous examples of attacks that require only a single malformed
packet, such as the Teardrop attack (mentioned in [4]) and the Land attack [11].
2Furthermore, even so called amplification attacks, where an attacker causes a
large number of packets to inundate the victim, are often instigated by a much
smaller packet flow (e.g., by an attacker broadcasting a single forged ‘echo-
request’ [12] or ARP request [13] on a LAN segment). There are also known
reconnaissance attacks (e.g., for discovering vulnerable machines), which make
use of a small number of specially crafted packets, such as the TCP idle scan
[14].
The composition of the Internet as interconnected autonomous systems (AS)
is considered to be one of the major issues with implementing IP traceback [1].
Each connected network is independently and uniquely architected, implemented
and administered. Oe et. al. [1] propose a two-part solution to the IP traceback
problem, modelled after the Internet routing hierarchy (i.e., Exterior and Interior
Gateway Protocols). The exterior IP traceback architecture is used to determine
which AS a packet came from, whereas interior traceback yields the originating
router, within the AS. Under this scheme, it can be said that existing proposals
for IP traceback (discussed later) could yield the same level of “precision’ as
an external traceback system by providing the address of the gateway router to
the network from which the attack originated. Lee et. al. [2] consider traceback
“precision” to be a measure of the exclusivity of the traceback result, that is,
identifying one or a group of potential attack sources.
This two-part traceback architecture is further explored and developed by
Hazeyama et. al. [3], who distinguish between interdomain and intradomain IP
traceback. They propose an OSI layer 2 traceback system for switched Ethernet
networks which builds on the SPIE system by Snoeren et. al. [4]. Their pro-
posal and prototype implementation however places impractical constraints on
the architecture of the switched Ethernet network by implementing the solution
on the gateway router (discussed later). Furthermore, the accuracy of the trace-
back result cannot be guaranteed without placing considerable demands on the
routing/switching hardware, both in terms of increased CPU loads and extra
network traffic generated. Our work removes the requirement for a specific net-
work topology by placing the traceback modules within the Ethernet switches
themselves rather than in the gateway routers. In doing so, the scalability of the
SPIE system is retained, with the audit processes being distributed throughout
the network.
The rest of this paper is organised as follows: Section 2 outlines our proposal
and provides implementation details. Description of our testbed equipment and
preliminary evaluation of our deployment follows in Section 3. Section 4 describes
related work, and conclusions and future research are discussed in Section 5.
2 Auditing at the Switch
Our work adapts the SPIE system [15] for switched Ethernet, with the packet
audit being conducted at the network switches, rather than at leaf routers as
in [3]. We address the traffic visibility issue with the use of switch port mirror-
ing, and provide a prototype implementation to establish the feasibility of our
3approach. We start by identifying the main issues and describe how these were
resolved, before identifying our assumptions and goals.
2.1 Overview
The SPIE system [4] [15] is an implementation of a space efficient packet audit
conducted at the network routers. The purpose of the audit is to allow a user
to query the routers as to whether they have seen a given packet or not. A
graph can then be constructed of the packet’s route through the network from
first to last hop router. Alternative approaches (to a ‘logging’ based system) are
mentioned briefly in the related work section.
As depicted in Figure 1, a typical deployment of SPIE would involve an
Intrusion Detection System (IDS ), the SPIE traceback manager (STM ) and
Data Generation Agents (DGA). Upon seeing a suspect packet, the IDS generates
an alert that is translated into a traceback request to be sent by the STM to the
DGA deployed at each routing node.
Fig. 1. The interaction between the main components in a typical SPIE deployment.
The IDS sees a suspect packet and generates an alert; the packet p and timestamp t
are sent to the STM, which creates a traceback request to be dispatched to the router
DGAs. After searching for the packet in their logs, each DGA will send a traceback
reply with the search result and (if positive) the time during which the packet was
seen.
The need for IP Traceback systems arises from the ease with which a host
can generate and send IP packets with an arbitrary source address in the packet
headers. However, tracing network messages at the network layer (i.e., IP pack-
ets) cannot reveal the originating host when that host’s local network employs
a Data Link layer, as is the case with Ethernet. One can trace IP packets to the
originating gateway router, but needs to trace frames beyond this to identify the
originating host machine.
4However, how can the originating host’s identity (i.e., the result of the frame
trace) be expressed? Within an ethernet network, machines are uniquely iden-
tified by their network interface MAC address, a IEEE designated 6-byte hex-
adecimal string. However, a malicious party can spoof the MAC address as easily
as they can spoof the IP address. Instead, we borrow from [3] in expressing a
machine’s unique identity as the pairing {sID, pNO} where sID is the originat-
ing switch identifier and pNO is the port number on the given switch, through
which the machine accesses the network.
2.2 Implementation Issues
The main issues we need to address in designing and implementing our frame
traceback for Switched-Ethernet are modification of the existing SPIE system
to capture the originating machine’s unique {sID, pNO} pairing within stored
frames, reliably establishing causality between a given frame and the originating
switch-port, and achieving adequate visibility of the traffic originating from a
switch’s directly connected hosts. We use an independent bloom filter to rep-
resent each port, and use the switch MAC address table to determine the ap-
propriate filter for a given frame. Switch port mirroring is used to provide the
switch-DGA (our extended DGA) with the required egress traffic from each host
attached to the switch. We provide the details of our implementation which
addresses these issues below.
Modification of SPIE. We deploy the SPIE audit processes at the network
switches of a Data Link network, specifically a Switched-Ethernet. As already
mentioned, SPIE [4] [15] consists of two main components (DGA and STM). A
DGA is deployed within or in close proximity to each router. It is charged with
executing the packet audit, by generating and storing a unique hash for every
packet arriving at the routing node for forwarding. The hash input is the packet
‘signature’ consisting of the packet header excluding those fields likely to change
in transit (e.g., the TTL field). This is because a packet is hashed by each DGA
it arrives at, and so the signature must be universally uniform.
The DGA performs k independent hashes over the input; each n-bit hash
output is treated as an index into a 2n element bit array (Bloom filter). The
bloom filter elements are all initially set to 0, and the index specified by each
hash output is set to 1. Membership tests then consist of computing the k in-
dependent hashes, and checking the indices at the specified positions; when any
of these are 0, then the membership test fails. As the number of elements set to
1 increases, false positives become more likely; the bloom filter becomes satu-
rated and so must be swapped out and archived. The DGA determines which of
the archived bloom filters are suitable for querying based on the latest time the
packet could have traversed the router (given as a timestamp in the traceback
request). Diagrams of these processes aren’t replicated here and are available in
[3] and [4].
The SPIE DGA decomposes into two core components relevant to our imple-
mentation; one of these is a loadable kernel module (spie mem) and the other
5is a user space process (dgad). The dgad maintains a fifo ring buffer (circular
array) of size max records. Each array element is a trace-record structure defin-
ing a bloom filter and timing information. The default value for max records is
6, which equates to a 60 second traceback window as bloom filters are swapped
every 10 seconds (these are user configurable parameters - discussion of potential
trade-offs and analytical bounds for SPIE are available in [4]). The dgad process
maps each new bloom filter into the kernel’s memory space for spie mem using
the kiobuf mechanism, to avoid costly copy operations [19].
In our switch-based solution, we increase the size of the dgad ring buffer to
size max records∗numberofports, as we need a separate set of trace-records for
each switch port. This is still implemented as a one dimensional array, but we
use pointer manipulation to simulate a separate ring buffer every max records
elements. An extra dimension is also added into the kiobuf array maintained by
spie mem to represent the current and next records for each switch port.
Rather than using one current bloom filter, at any given time our modified
spie mem makes use of an array of n current bloom filters, one for each switch
port. The initial MAC address table (discussed below) is parsed by the modified
dgad code and we export the current MAC address mapping for each switch-port
to the /proc file system. These values can then be communicated to the kernel
space spie mem via the sysctl interface. When processing a frame, the hashing
procedures in the kernel module establish the origin port from the latest MAC
address table values, and store the hash output into the appropriate trace record.
Given a traceback request, tReq{p, t}, consisting of a packet p, and timestamp
t, the switch-DGA checks the appropriate records based on t. When a match is
found, the ring buffer index of the current record reveals the source port, and
this is returned to the requesting STM. Our search algorithm then has a running
time of O(n). The xDGA search algorithm in [3] needs to hash the packet with
every possible combination of pNO and sID in the worst case, and is thus of the
order O(n2).
Establishing causality between a given frame and the originating switch-
port. We have already mentioned the switch MAC address table (MAC-table
for convenience), used by all Ethernet switches to provide the switching func-
tion. The MAC-table is automatically generated and maintained in the switch by
the process of source learning. The table is a mapping between MAC addresses
and port numbers; upon receiving a frame, the switch will store an entry in the
table that maps the port on which the frame arrived to the source address of
that frame. Thus, the switch knows which hosts are accessible over which ports.
When a host transmits a frame, the switch will perform a table lookup on the
frame’s destination address to determine the appropriate egress switch-port and
learn the frame’s source address mapping for the MAC-table, from the ingress
switch-port.
Even when the source MAC is forged through software, the current switch
MAC-table will be updated to display the mapping between the port and the
newly learned (forged) address. We can thus rely on the MAC-table to reveal a
6given frame’s originating port. By deploying the audit process at the network
switches themselves we anticipate that the use of the most current MAC-table
is not prohibitively expensive, as was the case in the configuration by Hazeyama
et. al. [3] (see also Section 4).
Achieving Adequate Traffic Visibility. Achieving adequate visibility is
a challenge when deploying any kind of network monitoring procedures within
a switched Ethernet. In contrast to traditional ‘shared medium’ Ethernet, a
switched environment means that each host operates over an exclusive collision
domain between itself and the switch. Frames sent from one host cannot collide
with frames sent from another host, and so the (medium) access contention issue
is eliminated. However, this also means that there is no suitable vantage point
from which to observe all traffic generated by the switch’s directly connected
hosts [20], except from within the switch itself of course. If one were to simply
plug a network monitor onto an arbitrary switch port, the only traffic the monitor
would see is broadcast traffic (e.g., ARP requests), and unicast traffic for which
the switch doesn’t currently have an appropriate entry in its MAC-table.
Most modern switches allow traffic from one or more ports to be duplicated
and sent to another port, known as the monitor port. This feature is generically
referred to as port mirroring, though manufacturers use various names (e.g.,
CISCO calls the monitor port the Switch Port Analyser - SPAN). Though the
implementation and operation of port mirroring is not standardized, [16] iden-
tifies the “copy port” as being one of the mechanisms available for monitoring
switched Ethernets. In our solution, one of the switch-ports is designated as the
monitor port, and the egress traffic from all other ports to which hosts are at-
tached (i.e., excluding the uplinks to other switches) is mirrored to the monitor
port by the switch operating system. We have performed some experiments to
establish how reliable the mirroring process is in a loaded network and results
are provided in Section 3.
2.3 Assumptions and Goals
We make a number of assumptions which are presented and rationalised below.
1. The local network is composed of a switched Ethernet LAN. This implies a
tree-like topology of arbitrary diameter.
2. Any given port on a network switch can be attached to a network terminal
node (e.g., a desktop machine), or to a network routing node (i.e., a router,
bridge, hub or switch).
3. At least one port is available on each switch for hosting the DGA tapbox.
4. The switch offers a port monitoring function that can at least monitor egress
traffic from every switch port attached to a network terminal node. Ports
leading to routing nodes are not monitored.
5. The switch MAC-table is updated for every frame received by the switch.
6. The source MAC (and/or IP) address of any frame might be forged.
77. A record exists that identifies the machine connected to each switch-port at
any given time (e.g., maintained by the network administrator).
The first four assumptions reflect our decision to deploy the DGA as a switch
tap box. Assumption four refers to differing port mirroring functionalities; some
switches allow replication of either ingress or egress traffic, or both. For the pur-
poses of our audit, we require only the packets a host transmits. On smaller
non-managed switches, the mirroring functionality might be restricted to mon-
itoring only one port at any one time, which is unsuitable for the switch-DGA.
The fifth assumption is related to the use of the MAC-table in conjunction with
a frame’s source MAC address to establish the source switch port. If network
users are able to arbitrarily change their machines physical connection point,
then identifying the port from which a frame originated will be meaningless.
Hence the need for assumption 7 which seems reasonable within the context of
managed networks (e.g., within an enterprise or university campus). An alterna-
tive and equivalent assumption could be that the switch-ports are secured (e.g.,
by adequate physical security), in which case such a record is not required.
Given a traceback request, tReq{p, t}, consisting of a packet p, and timestamp
t, the switch-DGA will provide a traceback reply tResp{mT, pNO}; mT is the
result of the membership test and pNO is the port number (which is null if mT
is false). A key difference between our proposal and the SPIE system as per [15]
is that the STM will not be able to provide a graph depicting a traced packet’s
route within the network. Rather, it provides {sID, pNO}, or false, in the case
that the packet was not from within our administrative domain.
The reason for this difference is our deployment of the switch-DGA at the
switch, rather than between switches. A packet p originating from a port on
switch sw1 and destined for a host on switch sw2 will only be accounted for by
the switch-DGA on sw1. As far as the switch-DGA on sw2 is concerned, p doesn’t
exist. Thus the STM can expect that only one positive response is returned and
when there is more than one, at least (n − 1) are false positives. Monitoring
between the switches using a passive tap would eliminate the traffic visibility
issue and remove traffic mirroring requirements from the switches (whilst also
providing ideal locations for IDS deployment). Furthermore, this could be easily
set up using a cheap network hub sitting between the switch uplinks. However, to
determine the source port of an incoming frame, the DGA in this configuration
would have to maintain valid MAC-tables of every switch accessible beyond
the link through which the frame arrived. In our configuration, a switch-DGA
receives traffic only from hosts on its own switch and so can implicitly assume
the sID for any given frame.
3 Prototype Implementation
As mentioned previously we have deployed a prototype implementation by adapt-
ing the SPIE source code, to demonstrate the efficacy of our proposal. Our test-
bed topology is composed of eight host machines connected to a cisco switch.
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Fast-Ethernet network interface. The switch is a Catalyst 3500XL series run-
ning Cisco IOS v.12.0(5), with a total of 24 100Mbit/s Fast-Ethernet ports and
2 1000Mbit/s Gigabit-Ethernet ports. The switch offers a port monitor function
(called SPAN - switch port analyzer port) that can mirror n source ports to n
monitor ports. The monitor port receives both egress and ingress traffic for each
switch port assigned to it, and this is not configurable (even though switch-DGA
only requires egress traffic). All equipment uses NTP for clock synchronisation.
Two of the host machines run an old linux kernel, version 2.4.2 − 2, as the
kernel patch files used during installation of the SPIE components were derived
against this kernel. One of these, ‘red’, served as the switch-DGA and the other,
‘fal’, hosted the STM and IDS (Snort v.1.9.1 [17]). The remaining six machines
(‘erb1’ - ‘erb6’) are used to generate traffic for testing purposes and they run linux
kernel v.2.6.20. The switch is instructed to mirror traffic from ports 1 through 6
(the erb machines) to port 7 (STM and IDS on fal) and also to port 8 (switch-
DGA on red). It should be noted that the switch is not normally expected to
have two mirror ports active as the STM would be at a separate location in the
network, for instance at a central router.
The prototype switch-DGA has been tested using traffic generated by the six
erb machines. The snort IDS running on fal was configured with a simple rule
that generated an alert whenever an ICMP echo request was seen between any
two erb machines (e.g., erb1 ping erb2). The STM on fal created and sent trace
requests for every alert generated by snort, and switch-DGA was able to confirm
the source port (and by inference the originating machine).
It should be noted that our prototype uses a static configuration for the port
MAC addresses parsed from a configuration file which simulates the MAC-table.
Though the switch-DGA already has a mechanism by which the user space dgad
can communicate new MAC values for each port to the kernel (sysctl), we have
not yet implemented the mechanism for retrieving the switch MAC-table. One
approach is to use SNMP, as an agent already exists on the testbed switch that
reports traffic statistics. A trap could be used to cause the switch to report a
change in the currently mapped MAC address for all monitored ports to a SNMP
client running on the same machine hosting the DGA.
Preliminary Evaluation We have performed some simple tests to establish
the feasibility of using the switch port mirroring function as a means of providing
the traffic generated by host machines to the switch-DGA. Our audit configu-
ration rests on the reliability of this mechanism. The implementation of port
mirroring will vary between manufacturers, but it is reasonable to expect that
on an oversubscribed switch the mirroring processes may become of secondary
priority; in trying to keep up with frame switching the switch may drop frames
from ingress/egress mirroring queues for instance [20]. We present the results of
our preliminary experiments below.
The first set of measurements was about establishing how well the switch can
keep up with switching and mirroring traffic from a number of noisy sources. We
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flood mode. During a five second burst each erb sent and received an average
of 23000 frames. That is just under 5000 frames/second, and with each frame
occupying 98 bytes ‘on the wire’, this equates to around 4Mbit/s bandwidth
(FastEthernet is good for traffic up to 100Mbit/s). Three source erb machines
(erb2, erb4 and erb6) instigated their five second ping flood simultaneously. The
switch was instructed to mirror traffic from erb2 to red, from erb4 to fal and
from erb6 to erb1. The snort IDS was running in binary logging mode on the
three monitor machines (red, fal and erb1), as depicted in Figure 2. A comparison
was then made between the packets sent/received by each source (as reported
by ping) with the packets seen in the monitor machine snort logs. In all cases
the switch was able to keep up the mirroring with a 0% drop rate. This was
maintained even after we repeated the measurement and configured the switch to
mirror traffic from both the source and destination erb machines to each monitor
host (erb2 and erb3 mirrored to red, erb4 and erb5 to fal, erb6 and erb3 to erb1).
Furthermore, in this configuration of six source monitor ports, the average round
trip time for each frame (as reported by ping) was the same as with only three
source ports. We would expect the round trip times to have increased had the
switching function adversely affected the ‘normal’ switching functions.
Fig. 2. Conceptual view of switch-port and mirroring configuration during testing
Another potential bottleneck in our switch-DGA configuration is the ability
of the monitor machine to keep up with a large volume of traffic being sent
to it by the switch mirroring processes. One set of results (above) shows that
the switch can handle the mirroring process whilst maintaining the performance
of the normal switching functions. Thus our next set of measurements was to
establish how many noisy sources our monitor host could keep track of reliably.
We designate erb1 as monitor host, running snort in binary packet logging mode.
A number of traces was taken, with noisy traffic again being simulated with 5
10
second simultaneous ping floods. The number of sources being mirrored to erb1
was increased for each trace, and we give some average values in table 1.
Table 1. Summary - percentage packet loss at the monitor host, as noisy sources are
increased
No.ofSources TotalFramesSent %FrameLoss RoundTripT ime(avg) FramesSent(avg)
1 52,930 0 0.185 26,465
2 113,758 0 0.1645 28,439
3 153,391 0.32 0.186 25,565
4 192,205 14.5 0.198 24,026
We begin to observe a packet loss beyond three noisy sources, which has
adverse ramifications on the requirement of accountability for any given packet
originating at the switch. We discuss potential solutions in the conclusion and
future work section that follows. However, it should be noted that our tests were
designed to simulate extreme conditions, that is, multiple sources generating a
large traffic volume simultaneously. In general these are not representative of
‘average’ conditions in an Ethernet LAN.
4 Related Work
Whilst in recent years there have been a number of proposals as to how the source
of spoofed IP packets might be identified, the problem itself was recognised long
ago. A 1985 Bell Labs technical report (by the creator of the ’88 Morris Worm)
considers the weaknesses in TCP/IP that could be leveraged by an attacker
wishing to masquerade as a trusted host [5]. A seminal paper by Bellovin in
1989 describes this “security hole” and discusses some potential solutions [6].
We now give a brief overview of the most prominent existing IP traceback
proposals, followed by a description of the (OSI) layer 2 traceback work by
Hazeyama et. al., and compare this to our proposal.
4.1 IP Traceback
IP traceback systems can generally be classified as either reactive or proactive.
Reactive systems initiate their trace only in response to an observed attack,
whilst proactive systems continually audit the packet flow as it traverses the
network [4].
Generally, reactive systems generally attempt to infer the origin of an ob-
served (and ongoing) attack by monitoring the state of the attacking packet
stream. One approach is controlled flooding proposed by Burch and Cheswick
[7]. Downstream network connections are selectively ‘flooded’ with packets in
order to detect a change in the attacking packet flow. Another is Centertrack
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[8] where an ‘overlay’ network connects all gateway routers with a central track-
ing machine to determine “ingress adjacency” (i.e., which adjacent network the
traffic came from) .
Proactive systems can facilitate traceback after the attack flow has stopped.
Generally, proactive traceback systems introduce state to a stateless protocol
(IP), and they can be distinguished by the way they satisfy this goal. The main
approaches are logging (as seen in SPIE), packet marking and messaging.
The core idea behind packet marking is that each routing node marks a
packet with its identity, allowing the receiving host to reconstruct the path
taken through the network. An elaborate packet marking scheme, Compressed
Edge Fragment Sampling, is proposed by Savage et. al. [9]. Messaging is similar
to packet marking in that again the routing nodes signal their presence on the
packet’s network path but do so out-of-band (i.e., with additional messages).
Bellovin et. al. propose a new type of ICMP message for this purpose [10].
The overheads associated with the various traceback processes prohibit de-
terministic implementations . The authors of the aforementioned messaging and
packet marking proposals mitigate these overheads by describing probabilistic
processes (e.g., marking every nth packet). This is typically rationalised by as-
suming that an attack will involve a high number of packets but as already stated,
there are numerous examples of attacks requiring only a single malformed packet.
No matter which technique is employed, the processes which enable sub-
sequent packet traceback are deployed at the network routers. Thus, by their
nature they cannot trace beyond the last router on the path back to the origin
network. As soon as network hardware operating at an OSI layer other than the
network layer is encountered, the traceback ‘chain’ is broken. We expect such
hardware to exist at least once between any two hosts connected through the
Internet (unless these are directly connected to routers).
4.2 A Layer 2 Extension to Hash Based IP Traceback.
As mentioned previously, Oe et. al. [1] propose a hierarchical traceback archi-
tecture. External IP traceback is used to identify a source network (autonomous
system - AS) and then internal traceback is used to identify the source machine
within the AS. The work by Hazeyama et. al. [3] is an implementation of an
internal traceback system for switched ethernet. Their work also builds on the
SPIE system.
Rather than deploying the DGA at the network switches, their extended
DGA, xDGA is deployed within the network’s gateway routers. When a frame
is received at a router, the sID from which it originated is inferred from the
frame destination MAC address (i.e., the address of the router interface which
receives it). The assumption here is that every switch in our network is directly
connected to a gateway router, as depicted by Figure 2. The xDGA maintains
a local copy of the MAC-table of each switch for which it is responsible so the
appropriate MAC-table is used to determine pNO. The xDGA then extracts the
packet signature, and concatenates the sID and pNO onto this before performing
the SPIE hash.
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When a traceback request is received the xDGA will need to check through
the archived bloom filters for every switch, concatenating all combinations of
sID and pNO onto the packet before performing the appropriate hashes for
membership testing. The search algorithm has a worst case running time of
O(n2).
Fig. 3. Network topology and placement of the xDGA in “A Layer 2 extension to Hash
based IP traceback” [3]. The switch identifier is determined by the frame destination
MAC address and the appropriate switch MAC-table is used to determine the port
number. Thus chains of switches are not possible, as the destination MAC address
could not identify the originating switch.
Discussion. The deployment of xDGA (as per [3]) within gateway routers serves
to alleviate the traffic visibility problem, as the router will see all traffic that
leaves the network. However, traffic sent between hosts on the same switch is
not observed. This is acceptable in processing trace requests originating from an
external network as they involve packets that must have traversed the gateway.
It does not however provide accountability for malicious activity within our
network. The deployment of an internal traceback system in the first case implies
that you accept the possibility of malevolent parties operating within the bounds
of your administrative domain.
Since the xDGA is deployed in gateway routers, and the router interface
receiving a given frame is used to identify the source switch, an implicit as-
sumption is made of the network topology. Specifically the network must be a
rooted tree, with diameter exactly 2 and radius exactly 1. The gateway router is
designated root, and edges are only allowed between the root and leaf vertices,
but not between leaf vertices (i.e., between switches). We consider this to be an
artificial assumption, especially for larger networks that more likely consist of a
multilevel hierarchy of switches and internal routers. The xDGA algorithm fails
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when a chain of switches terminates at the gateway router as you cannot infer
the originating switch identity, for a given frame received.
As already seen, if a machine transmits a frame with a forged source MAC
address, the switch MAC-table would be updated to reflect the the new (forged)
MAC to port pairing. However, the xDGA’s cached address tables are updated
at an interval of sixty seconds allowing ample opportunity for creating spoofed
frames that will be stored in the bloom filter with an incorrect pNO. The reason
for this low refresh rate is the prohibitively high costs on the router both in
terms of network traffic and processing time. Consider that the xDGA would
have to constantly request the sum of all MAC address tables for all switches
connected to it in order to retain each table’s validity.
5 Conclusions and Future Work
Our work attempts to address the issues associated with performing a network
message audit in a switched Ethernet environment. One of these is the issue
of traffic visibility, which we try to overcome with port mirroring. Preliminary
evaluation of our equipment’s abilities is provided to establish the feasibility of
this as a practical solution. The second key issue is establishing causality between
the identity reported in a given frame’s source address field and the identity of the
originating switch and port. We borrow from [3] in using the switch MAC-table
but distribute the audit process across the network, rather than in a central leaf
router. The goal of retaining a valid MAC-table for each received frame then
becomes more realistic. In this sense, our configuration retains the scalability
provided by the original SPIE system. This is important given the size of some
corporate and university network administrative domains. If true end to end
traceback is to become a reality, every distinct autonomous system comprising
the Internet would be expected to implement an internal traceback system. The
way these systems are deployed will vary, depending on network type; consider
differences between the IP networks formed by routers and the Ethernet networks
formed by switches for instance, as demonstrated in [3] and our work. Thus one
possible avenue of future investigation is the deployment of packet traceback in
other network types.
We have shown that even under heavy load, with three simultaneous noisy
sources being monitored, the monitor host can keep up with 99.68% of source
traffic. Furthermore, the switch is able to accurately replicate the traffic from
six noisy source ports to three distinct monitor hosts. However, a large drop
in reliability was seen at the monitor host with the addition of a fourth noisy
source. There are a number of ways in which to limit the number of frames
dropped by the monitor host. This may include rate limiting each switch port
(assuming the switch allows such an operation), or equipping the monitor host
with more than one network interface to distribute the load of receiving mirrored
frames. Another obvious approach is to sacrifice one of the Gigabit-Ethernet
ports for the mirroring function (though these are traditionally used as uplinks,
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i.e., to connect to other routing nodes). An investigation could be taken into the
practicality of these and other approaches.
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